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 NOTE 
Exceeding the Scope of an Easement: 
“Expanded Use” Within a Single Cable  
Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., 852 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 2017) 
Matthew Neuman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Most people likely do not give a second thought to the manner in which 
utilities reach their homes.  Water, gas, electricity, cable, and internet service 
must all make their way from source to faucet, stove, light fixture, television, 
and entertainment device.  A complex infrastructure system exists both below 
ground in pipes and conduits and above ground on utility poles.  In cities, utility 
poles within generic utility easements are often adorned with a multitude of 
wires – of varying dimensions, levels, types, and ownership – constantly deliv-
ering electricity and information. 
At the core of this delivery system is the inconvenient fact that, in the 
journey from point A to point B, the pipe or wire must cross a vast parcel net-
work of differentiated ownership often composed of owners who either do not 
want the intrusion or want to be fairly compensated for sharing their property 
with the intrusion.  And in the famous “bundle of rights” that is property, “the 
right to exclude” gives the owner the prerogative to protest any invasion.1 
It is in this context that easements, the necessary envelope in which those 
critical utilities may pass across private ownership, come into existence pri-
marily through negotiations or condemnation proceedings.  In the end, the 
holder of the easement compensates the servient estate and a strip of land be-
comes burdened by the easement.  As technology develops and companies 
evolve, a critical question emerges: to what extent may that easement holder 
use its easement? 
As developed in detail below, the facts of this case, despite intricacies 
when examined in detail, present a scenario that is rather straightforward.  A 
utility, operating an expansive system of infrastructure, provides electrical ser-
vice to rural areas.  A change in operation requirements prompts the utility to 
add to its easement a new piece of infrastructure – a fiber-optic cable – for 
 
* B.S. Environmental Geoscience, Texas A&M University, 2008; J.D. Candidate, Uni-
versity of Missouri School of Law, 2019; Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law 
Review, 2018-2019.  I am grateful to Professor Freyermuth for his insight and guidance, 
the Missouri Law Review staff for encouragement and edits, especially Aristotle Butler 
and Emma Masse for their helpful suggestions early in the process, and my wife for 
always offering support. 
 1. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). 
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internal communication purposes.  This event complies wholly with the terms 
of the easement.  That piece of equipment may also be used in an additional 
commercial manner that does not impose any further burden on the servient 
estate than if the equipment is used only for internal communication purposes.  
The utility seizes the opportunity.  Not only does the utility defray costs for the 
installation and upkeep of the necessary fiber-optic cable, but also the resulting 
commercial telecommunications service benefits an expanded audience of us-
ers.  From the perspective of the landowner, despite a philosophical query con-
cerning the forfeiture of a theoretical “stick” from the “bundle of rights,” there 
is no physical difference within the easement. 
Part II of this Note explores the previous hypothetical in the facts of Bar-
field v. Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative,2 a class action lawsuit involving 
the scope of easements under Missouri law.  Part III provides a brief overview 
of the legal background of the case and the concept of “expanded use” of ease-
ments.  Part IV analyzes the court’s reasoning in the case.  Part V illustrates 
how the outcome of the case is perhaps a stricter interpretation of “expanded 
use” under Missouri law than previous cases and proposes that considering 
“expanded use” in such a manner may be contrary to public policy. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative (“Sho-Me”) traces its roots back to 
its formation in 1941 as an agriculture cooperative.3  In 1947, Sho-Me incor-
porated as a public utility and provided wholesale and retail electric service; in 
1992, the corporation converted into a rural electric cooperative (“REC”).4  The 
purpose of a REC is to supply, promote, and facilitate expansion of electric 
energy in rural areas.5 
 
 2. 852 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 3. SHO-ME POWER ELEC. COOP., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2016), 
http://shomepower.com/media/1071/2016annualreport.pdf. 
 4. Id. 
 5. MO. REV. STAT. § 394.030 (2016).  A REC has power to 
 
generate, manufacture, purchase, acquire, accumulate and transmit electric en-
ergy, and to distribute, sell, supply, and dispose of electric energy in rural areas 
to its members, to governmental agencies and political subdivisions, and to 
other persons not in excess of ten percent of the number of its members . . . .  [It 
has the power to ] construct, purchase, take, receive, lease as lessee, or other-
wise acquire, and to own, hold, use, equip, maintain, and operate, and to sell, 
assign, transfer, convey, exchange, lease as lessor, mortgage, pledge, or other-
wise dispose of or encumber, electric transmission and distribution lines or sys-
tems . . . and any and all kinds and classes of real or personal property whatso-
ever, which shall be deemed necessary, convenient or appropriate to accomplish 
the purpose for which the cooperative is organized[, and] . . . to exercise the 
power of eminent domain in the manner provided by the laws of this state for 
the exercise of that power by corporations constricting or operating electric 
transmission and distribution lines or systems. 
2
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Prior to 1992, Sho-Me obtained easements within thousands of parcels of 
land in the southern portion of Missouri.6  The language of the easements gave 
Sho-Me the privilege to construct and operate electric transmission lines across 
these tracts.7  The grants of these easements varied, but the district court deter-
mined the easements of interest in this dispute to be those that were either ease-
ments for an electric transmission line only, grants for an electric transmission 
line with unspecified appurtenances, or appurtenances including specific refer-
ences to communications equipment.8 
Sho-Me initially communicated with distant power substations along its 
network of electric transmission lines using microwave radio frequencies, but 
the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) directed in 1995 that utili-
ties could no longer continue this practice.9  As a result, Sho-Me installed fiber-
optic cables10 adjacent to its electrical cables for internal communications.11  
Sho-Me also established a subsidiary, Sho-Me Technologies, LLC,12 to sell 
commercial telecommunications to the public utilizing the excess capacity on 
its fiber-optic cable.13 
 
MO. REV. STAT. § 394.080.1(4), (7), (11) (2016) (amended 2018). 
 6. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 798. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.  The district court grouped the easements into three categories; Category 
1A, Category 2A, and Category 3A, were at issue upon appeal.  Category 1A consisted 
of “[e]asements for electric transmission line only or for electric transmission line with 
unspecified appurtenances.”  Id.  Category 1B included “[e]asements for electric trans-
mission lines and appurtenances which include specific references to communications 
equipment,” and Category 1C contained “[c]ourt orders condemning easements limited 
to electric transmission lines and generic appurtenances or specifying related commu-
nications equipment.”  Id.  Category 1A had 1972 easements, Category 1B had 653 
easements, and Category 1C had 22 easements.  Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., 
10 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1010 (W.D. Mo. 2014).  Summary judgment was granted in favor 
of Sho-Me on other categories of easements referencing external telephone/communi-
cation purposes.  Id. at 1017–19, 1028. 
 9. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 798.  The frequencies that utilities used previously were 
sold to cellular telephone providers.  Barfield, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 1004. 
 10. A fiber-optic cable consists of glass fibers; electric signals are converted to 
light and transmitted through these fibers at speeds exceeding those provided by DSL 
or cable modem.  Types of Broadband Connections, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/gen-
eral/types-broadband-connections (last visited Aug. 22, 2018). 
 11. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 798. 
 12. Future references to “Sho-Me” include Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative 
and its subsidiary, Sho-Me Technologies, L.L.C.  See generally SHO-ME POWER ELEC. 
COOP., supra note 3, at 1 (“Sho-Me Technologies, L.L.C. . . . is a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative.”). 
 13. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 798; see SHO-ME POWER ELEC. COOP., supra note 3, at 1 
(“What began as an upgrade to the extensive internal communications network has now 
grown to encompass over 8,000 miles of fiber optic connectivity.”).  Per the limited 
powers enumerated in the REC statute, this REC was required to form the subsidiary 
to conduct the telecommunications business.  MO. REV. STAT. § 394.080 (amended 
2018). 
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The landholders subject to the Sho-Me easements filed a class action law-
suit against Sho-Me, alleging that the easements’ language did not allow the 
use of the fiber-optic cable for commercial telecommunication.14  Of the cate-
gories of easements recognized as lacking a reference to commercial telecom-
munications, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the land-
owners and held Sho-Me liable for trespass and unjust enrichment.15  A jury 
trial, pursued solely on the unjust enrichment claim, resulted in an award for 
the landowners in excess of $79,000,000.16  Sho-Me appealed.17  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ultimately held that Sho-Me’s use of 
the easements for public-serving telecommunication purposes exceeded the 
scope of its easements, so the trespass liability was affirmed; however, unjust 
enrichment was not an available remedy for a utility exceeding the scope of its 
easement.18 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Section A of this Part provides a summary of the legal framework regard-
ing easements in general.  Section B then transitions into a discussion of how 
Missouri courts have treated expanded use – the use beyond the scope of an 
easement.19  Expanded use is analyzed in the development of case law, in a 
2006 statutory provision, and in the sparse application of that statute.  Section 
C delves into an example where a Missouri court permissively allowed a more 
expansive use of an easement and a second example of when it did not.  Finally, 
Section D examines the consequences of trespass in the context of the holder 
of an easement misusing his or her rights. 
 
 14. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 798.  The case found its way to federal district court by 
way of diversity jurisdiction because one of the named plaintiffs was from Florida.  
Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., No, 11–4321–NKL, 2012 WL 2368517, at *1 
n.1 (W.D. Mo. June 21, 2012).  The instant case found the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in certifying the class of landowners.  Barfield, 852 F.3d at 806. 
 15. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 799. 
 16. Id.  The jury verdict equaled $1.88 per foot per year for the ten-year period in 
which Sho-Me utilized the fiber-optic cable for commercial-telecommunication pur-
poses.  Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., 309 F.R.D. 491, 496 n.4 (W.D. Mo. 
2015).  The jury was instructed to find the fair market rental value of Sho-Me’s use of 
the fiber-optic cables for the telecommunication use based off the ten-year period from 
the first unauthorized use up to the time of trial.  Id. at 496.  In terms of unjust enrich-
ment, this was the amount in which Sho-Me was unjustly benefitted by not obtaining 
proper easements from the landowners.  See id. at 502. 
 17. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 798. 
 18. Id. at 804–05. 
 19. See infra text accompanying notes 73–74 (further defining the expanded use 
easement). 
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss3/9
2018] EXCEEDING THE SCOPE OF AN EASEMENT 777 
A. A Primer on Missouri Easement Law 
Any legal discussion of an easement necessarily begins with the rights 
associated with the creation of that easement and its resulting characteristics.  
An easement is “a right only to one or more particular uses” of land.20  Ease-
ments are of two varieties: appurtenant or in gross.21  In the case of an easement 
appurtenant, the servient estate gives a benefit arising from the use of real prop-
erty to the dominant estate receiving that advantage.22  In other words, the dom-
inant estate is the piece of land that is benefitted by the easement, and the ser-
vient estate is the piece of land that is burdened by the easement.  Alternatively, 
an easement in gross exists without a dominant tenement; the right to use a 
piece of land is not dependent on the possession of any other tract of land.23  
An easement in gross is simply an easement that benefits another party.  Ease-
ments in gross of a commercial nature are assignable or capable of transfer.24 
The traditional affirmative easement, an easement allowing some partic-
ular use of land, is created by grant.25  The easement’s conveyance, or granting 
language, is crucial in defining the scope for which the easement may be used.26  
The interpretation of an easement created by a deed is a question of law, treated 
similar to the interpretation of any contract, and the intention of the grantor 
must be discerned from the instrument.27  That intention should come from the 
entirety of the instrument in accord with the common-sense meaning of the 
language present in the document.28  If there is any uncertainty about an ease-
ment’s scope, “[a]ny doubt . . . should be resolved in favor of the servient 
owner’s free and untrammeled use of the land.”29 
 
 20. Farmers Drainage Dist. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 255 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Mo. 1953). 
 21. Burg v. Dampier, 346 S.W.3d 343, 353 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). 
 22. Id.  An easement appurtenant essentially involves two tracts of land.  See id.  
One tract of land is benefitted to the detriment of the other.  Id.  For example, if Land-
owner A conveys a strip of land for ingress/egress over his tract as an easement appur-
tenant to a neighboring tract owned by Landowner B, that easement will benefit who-
ever owns the neighboring tract – the easement runs with the land.  So, when Land-
owner B deeds the tract to Landowner C, Landowner C now has the right of in-
gress/egress over the easement and Landowner B has the right no more. 
 23. Id.  An easement in gross benefits a party irrespective of his ownership of any 
tract of land.  Id.  For example, utility, railroad, and pipeline easements are common 
easements in gross.  See, e.g., Henley v. Cont’l Cablevision of St. Louis Cty., Inc., 692 
S.W.2d 825, 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).  The benefit is not to a specific tract of land but 
to a person or company. 
 24. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth. v. Ashley, 485 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1972). 
 25. R. WILSON FREYERMUTH ET AL., PROPERTY AND LAWYERING 520, 529 (3d ed. 
2011). 
 26. See, e.g., Maasen v. Shaw, 133 S.W.3d 514, 518–19 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). 
 27. Erwin v. City of Palmyra, 119 S.W.3d 582, 584–85 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
 28. Blackburn v. Habitat Dev. Co., 57 S.W.3d 378, 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
 29. Maasen, 133 S.W.3d at 519. 
5
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Although an easement is typically created by formal grant, that is not the 
only manner in which an easement may come into existence.30  In some cases, 
a generic grant has no use restrictions; the result of such a grant is an easement 
“of unlimited reasonable use.”31  An easement by prescription is a separate 
means of establishing an easement, which occurs when “use . . . is shown to 
have been continuous, uninterrupted, visible and adverse for a period of ten 
years.”32  Easements may also be created through condemnation by certain en-
tities for specific public uses when an agreement on compensation cannot be 
reached.33 
An easement may be either exclusive or nonexclusive.34  These terms de-
note the ability of the servient owner to use the easement.35  In an exclusive 
easement, the servient owner – the owner of the burdened estate – is excluded 
“from participation in the rights granted to the dominant owner,” but a non-
exclusive easement allows the servient owner “the privilege of sharing the ben-
efits conferred by the easement.”36  Put another way, an exclusive easement is 
one in which the owner of the easement holds all of the rights to use the ease-
ment to the exclusion of the owner of the land burdened by the easement and 
all others without the authorization of the easement holder.  But, if an easement 
is non-exclusive, the owner of the land burdened by the easement may still 
grant the use of the easement to others. 
B. The Development of “Expanded Use” 
The remainder of this Part discusses how Missouri courts have addressed 
the use of easements that are supposedly inconsistent with the terms of their 
grant because of an expanded use.  In St. Louis, Iron Mountain, & Southern 
Railway Company v. Cape Girardeau Bell Telephone Company, an early opin-
ion, Cape Girardeau & Chester Railway Company (“Railroad A”) acquired an 
easement through condemnation across the existing easement of the St. Louis, 
 
 30. Jacobs v. Brewster, 190 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Mo. 1945). 
 31. Maasen, 133 S.W.3d at 518.  In Maasen, the conveyance was merely for “[a] 
non-exclusive easement [fifty] feet wide.”  Id. (alteration in original). 
 32. Guerin v. Yocum, 506 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). 
 33. See MO. REV. STAT. § 523.010 (2016); Kamo Elec. Coop., v. Baker, 287 
S.W.2d 858, 861 (Mo. 1956).  This discussion does not cover all manners of creation 
of an easement but only those necessary for the analysis in the remainder of this Note.  
There are other manners of creating easements.  See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Grossman, 
351 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Mo. 1961) (agreement); Litchfield v. Boogher, 142 S.W. 302, 
303 (Mo. 1911) (reservation); King v. Jack Cooper Transp. Co., 708 S.W.2d 194, 196–
97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (necessity); Allee v. Kirk, 602 S.W.2d 922, 924–925 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1980) (estoppel); Causey v. Williams, 398 S.W.2d 190, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) 
(implication). 
 34. See Maasen, 133 S.W.3d at 518. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
6
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Iron Mountain, & Southern Railway Company (“Railroad B”).37  Railroad A 
then contracted with Cape Girardeau Bell Telephone Company, allowing the 
telephone company the right to construct and operate a system of telephone 
lines within the easement.38  The purpose of installing the lines was to serve 
the railroad, but the telephone company planned to use the lines to serve the 
public as well.39  Railroad B brought suit to enjoin the construction of the line 
across its right of way absent consent or compensation and alleged the use of 
the telephone lines for public service “amount[ed] to an additional burden on 
the plaintiff’s right of way.”40  Although the pertinent analysis needed to focus 
on the rights of an existing easement holder, the St. Louis Court of Appeals 
nevertheless set out an explanation of the rights between a fee owner41 and an 
easement holder in dicta that would be relied upon verbatim in future deci-
sions.42  The court explained: 
[W]here the adjacent owner of the fee has asserted a right, it is declared 
that, in so far as the telegraph company serves the purpose of the rail-
road, its occupancy of the right of way easement is not an additional 
servitude or burden upon the fee of which he may complain.  The right 
of the adjacent fee owner is precluded on the theory that such use is a 
legitimate development for railroad purposes essentially contemplated 
in the grant of the easement and for which he received compensation at 
the time.  Nevertheless, in so far as the telegraph or telephone company 
thus rightfully occupying the right of way serves the general public as 
a commercial enterprise, distinct from the avocation of the railroad, it 
constitutes a use of the right of way easement other than for railroad 
purposes, and it is therefore a servitude not contemplated in the original 
grant and a burden upon the fee of which the adjacent owner may right-
fully complain.  It is obvious the transmission of intelligence by means 
 
 37. 114 S.W. 586, 586 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 586–87.  The factual setup of the case is unique because it is the easement 
holder, not the landowner, complaining of an additional burden.  Id. at 587.  Although 
the case does not discuss consent from the landowner, this is likely because of the 
unique position of the railroad holding its right of way: “the law excludes the owner of 
the fee and all other persons from any occupancy of the surface within the confines of 
the right of way at all places other than at crossings, public or private, or other consistent 
uses accorded by the statute.”  Id. at 589. 
 41. The owner of the fee, or fee simple, is what a person would normally associate 
with ownership of land.  63C AM. JUR. 2D Property §12, Westlaw (database updated 
Aug. 2018).  Black’s Law Dictionary defines fee simple as “[a]n interest in land, that 
being the broadest property interest allowed by law, endures until the current holder 
dies without heirs.”  Fee Simple, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 42. Cape Girardeau Bell, 114 S.W. at 588; see, e.g., Barfield v. Show-Me Power 
Elec. Coop., 852 F.3d 795, 801 (8th Cir. 2017); Kan. City v. Ashley, 406 S.W.2d 584, 
592 (Mo. 1966); Eureka Real Estate & Inv. Co. v. S. Real Estate & Fin. Co., 200 S.W.2d 
328, 332 (Mo. 1947). 
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of electricity to all the world who may be willing to pay for the service 
is not a railroad use, and such service is certainly not contemplated 
within the grant of the railroad right of way, for it is entirely disassoci-
ated therefrom.43 
Because the complaining Railroad B possessed only an easement, the 
court, while acknowledging that the fee owner’s interest was not at issue, held 
“that the mere commercial use of the telephone under the circumstances men-
tioned” by Railroad A did not constitute any additional burden on Railroad B.44 
Cape Girardeau, in its explanation of a fee owner’s “high proprietary 
rights” to complain of “a servitude not contemplated in the original grant” re-
lied, in part, on three main sources:45 Western Union Telegraph Company v. 
Rich,46 American Telegraph and Telephone Company v. Pearce,47 and a trea-
tise on telegraph and telephone companies.48  Rich involved a landowner suing 
a telegraph company for cutting down trees on a railroad right-of-way, but ev-
idence that the telegraph company was acting in concert with the railroad com-
pany was excluded.49  The case acknowledged that a railroad is allowed to have 
additional infrastructure beyond its tracks that “reasonably tends to facilitate 
its business of transporting freight and passengers, and by such use in no man-
ner transcends the purposes and extent of the easement.”50  Furthermore, the 
court in Rich found that the telegraph company was not liable for damages 
because those damages arose from an undertaking that the railroad could have 
 
 43. Cape Girardeau Bell, 114 S.W. at 588. 
 44. Id. at 590. 
 45. Id. at 588–89.  A legal encyclopedia is referenced as well.  Id. at 589.  The 
encyclopedia entry explains: 
 
A telegraph or telephone line upon the right of way of a railroad company is, 
generally, an additional burden, for which the original owner of the land, if he 
retains the fee, is entitled to compensation; but where the line is constructed by 
the railroad company in good faith, for its own use, and is reasonably necessary 
for its operation, there is no additional servitude, but merely a legitimate devel-
opment of the easement originally acquired. 
 
THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW 1011–12 (James Cockcroft et 
al. eds., 2d ed. 1904), https://babel.ha-
thitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo1.ark:/13960/t2c82vn9g.  The citations for the entry overlap 
with other sources cited by the Cape Girardeau Bell court.  Compare id. at 1012, with 
Cape Girardeau Bell, 114 S.W. at 589. 
 46. 19 Kan. 517 (1878). 
 47. 18 A. 910 (Md. 1889) (consolidating ten cases, including American Tel. & 
Tel. Co. v. Pearce). 
 48. S. WALTER JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE 
COMPANIES § 147 (1906). 
 49. Rich, 19 Kan. at 519–20. 
 50. Id. at 520. 
8
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exercised without liability.51  Essentially, Rich stands for the proposition that 
“every additional burden cast upon the land outside of the purpose and scope 
of the original easement, no matter in whose behalf, gives to the land[owner] a 
new claim for compensation,” but its holding allows for physical modification 
within a railroad easement where necessary for a telegraph “so convenient if 
not indispensable” to the railroad’s operation.52 
In Pearce, a railroad company granted a telegraph and telephone com-
pany the right to erect and operate telephone and telegraph lines along its right 
of way.53  The telephone and telegraph company constructed a new, larger sys-
tem of poles, arms, and lines for its own business.54  The resulting infrastructure 
was of such significant character that the court described it as “not being put 
up in order to subserve or promote the business purposes of [the] railroad, and 
in no sense of the term can it be regarded as necessary, or reasonably neces-
sary.”55  The court determined that whether a new structure created an addi-
tional servitude, or a burden beyond the scope of the original easement, was a 
question of fact and found that the new line was an additional servitude.56  In 
analyzing the motive of the defendant telephone company in its construction 
of the new line, the court found that “the main object in constructing it . . . 
[was] not reasonably necessary for the purposes of the railroad.”57 
The final basis for the passage from Cape Girardeau comes from an early 
treatise concerning telegraph and telephone companies.58  The relevant sections 
in the treatise reference Rich and Pearce.59  Section 147 of the treatise further 
explains that a “telegraph line may have been originally constructed by the 
railroad company for its own use but upon a transfer, of such a line by the 
railroad company to a telegraph company, the owner of the fee may claim com-
pensation.”60  However, this statement is derived from a case in which a rail-
road assigned the ownership of its telegraph poles and lines to a telegraph com-
pany.61  That company in turn erected a new, larger line offset from the original 
line.62  Again, the court found that the new construction of the line was not 
 
 51. Id. at 520–21 (“Whatever it could do and would have done for its own use and 
benefit, and was so done, was, so far as the land–owner is concerned, damnum absque 
injuria, no matter who bore the expense; or perhaps more correctly, it was damages 
already paid for.”). 
 52. Id. 
 53. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Smith, 18 A. 910, 911 (Md. 1889) (consolidating 
ten cases, including American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pearce). 
 54. Id. at 915. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 913, 916. 
 57. Id. at 913. 
 58. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Cape Girardeau Bell Tel. Co., 114 S.W. 586, 587–
89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908). 
 59. JONES, supra note 48, § 147. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Hodges v. W. Union Tel. Co., 45 S.E. 572, 573 (N.C. 1903). 
 62. Id. at 574. 
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“reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the easement granted to the railroad 
company.”63 
Eureka Real Estate & Investment Company v. Southern Real Estate & 
Financial Company extends the logic applied in Cape Girardeau.64  In Eureka, 
a railroad company with an easement across a fee holder’s land licensed an 
electric company to construct poles and lines on its right of way as part of op-
erating the company’s streetcars.65  After partial abandonment of the tracks, 
the power line – used to supply power to streetcars on other sections of the 
track – was still a “necessary incidental purpose” of the easement.66  However, 
the construction of an additional line over the existing right of way – a line with 
“no connection whatever with the electric lines or purposes of the street railway 
except that some of its poles are used as guys for the streetcar company’s poles” 
– was held to be “an additional servitude and an interest in the land.”67  As in 
Cape Girardeau, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that the owner of an 
easement could not impose an additional burden upon the servient estate.68 
Early in the twenty-first century, a new Missouri statute, largely arising 
out of a legislative response to the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Kelo v. City of New London,69 sought to rein in the ability of private entities to 
engage in “expanded use” of easements.70  In 2006, the Missouri legislature 
created a statutory provision confining newly created easements of utilities to 
be “fixed and determined by the particular use for which the property was ac-
quired.”71  Under section 523.283, for a utility to make “expanded use of the 
property,” the utility must either condemn the property or make new contrac-
tual arrangements with the landowner.72 
“Expanded use” is defined as “[t]he exclusion of use by the current owner 
of the burdened property from an area greater than the area originally de-
scribed” or “[a]n increased footprint or burden greater than the footprint or 
burden originally described in the instrument of conveyance or condemnation 
 
 63. Id. at 576. 
 64. 200 S.W.2d 328, 332 (Mo. 1947). 
 65. Id. at 329. 
 66. Id. at 330. 
 67. Id. at 332. 
 68. Id. 
 69. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  In Kelo, a private nonprofit, on behalf of the City of 
New London, Connecticut, sought to condemn, through eminent domain, the property 
of holdouts within an area of land planned for economic development.  Id. at 473–75.  
The primary issue in the case was whether the economic development plan served a 
“public purpose,” a requirement under the Fifth Amendment for any taking.  Id. at 472, 
478–80.  The Court held that economic development could be a public purpose and that 
the property could be taken.  Id. at 485–86. 
 70. Dale A. Whitman, Eminent Domain Reform in Missouri: A Legislative Mem-
oir, 71 MO. L. REV. 721, 723, 751 (2006). 
 71. MO. REV. STAT. § 523.283.1 (2016). 
 72. Id. 
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petition.”73  The statute further clarifies that “increased footprint or burden” 
equates to “a different type of use or a use presenting an unreasonably burden-
some impact on the property, the landowner, or the activities being conducted 
on the property by the landowner.”74  Case law interpreting the statute is lim-
ited. 
Carroll Electric Cooperative Company v. Lambert applies section 
523.283 in the context of a proposed electric transmission line.75  In Carroll 
Electric, a REC sought to condemn a right of way for an electric distribution 
line.76  In the REC’s offer letter to the landowners, it proposed easement lan-
guage that specified the ability “to license, permit, or otherwise agree to the 
joint use or occupancy of the line or system by any other person, association or 
corporation for electrification or communication purposes.”77  At trial, the 
court dismissed the condemnation petition partly because the REC included the 
language pertaining to communication use; the court held that use beyond the 
authority of the REC in its eminent domain power.78  In the REC’s appeal of 
the trial court’s dismissal of the condemnation petition, the landowners argued 
that the use of the easement by other parties for communication purposes ex-
ceeded the electric cooperative’s authority.79  However, an engineer working 
on the project testified that the company was only condemning for electric pur-
poses and that third-party telecommunication companies would have to obtain 
their own easement.80 
 
 73. Id. § 523.283.2.  In the introduced version of HB 1944, “expanded use” was 
defined as: 
 
(1) The exclusion of use by the current owner of the burdened property from an 
area greater than the area originally contemplated at the time of acquisition by 
the condemning authority; (2) An increased footprint greater than the footprint 
originally contemplated at the time of acquisition by the condemning authority; 
(3) An attempt to confer property rights of any nature whatsoever to another 
entity other than a successor-in-interest; or (4) Any altered use which substan-
tially changes the ability of the current owner of the burdened property to oper-
ate farm machinery in the area of the property interest originally acquired by 
the condemning authority. 
 
H.B. 1944, 93d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006) (as introduced), 
https://house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills061/hlrbillspdf/4100L.04I.pdf; see also Whit-
man, supra note 70, at 751.  “Increased footprint” was defined as “a different use or a 
use that has greater impact on the property, the landowner, or the activities being con-
ducted on the property by the landowner.”  H.B. 1944; see also Whitman, supra note 
70, at 753. 
 74. MO. REV. STAT. § 523.283.2(2) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 75. 403 S.W.3d 637, 644–45 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 
 76. Id. at 639. 
 77. Id. at 641. 
 78. Id. at 639. 
 79. Id. at 644. 
 80. Id. at 642. 
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The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District agreed with the 
REC that lines for internal communication were essential to the operation of 
the electric system and that the power of eminent domain extended to that use.81  
Citing section 523.283, the REC conceded, and the court agreed, that “any use 
other than for electricity is an expanded use of the proposed easements which 
would be prohibited . . . without a new condemnation action or a negotiated 
expansion of the existing easement.”82  Based on the evidence in the record, 
there was no indication that the easements would be used for anything other 
than electric service.83  However, the REC’s power of eminent domain did ex-
tend to essential provisions, including communications between substations us-
ing a fiber-optic cable.84 
C. A Different Type of Use for Utility Easements Prior to Section 
523.283 
The use of an easement need not remain stagnant over time, but there are 
restrictions on how far from the original use the future use may be.  Henley v. 
Continental Cablevision of St. Louis County, Inc.85 demonstrates how the court 
can interpret older easements to allow for changes in technology over time.  In 
Henley, an easement granted in the early 1920s created the right to use a spec-
ified area across tracts in a subdivision for the purpose of constructing and 
maintaining electric, telephone, and telegraphic systems.86  Then, in the 1980s, 
a cable television company received a license from the easement holder to in-
stall cabling “for the purpose of transmitting television programs.”87  The land-
owners argued that the cable constituted an extra burden.88  The Missouri Court 
of Appeals for the Western District disagreed.89 
By interpreting the original easement with the broader purpose of “bring-
ing electrical power and communication into the homes of the subdivision,” 
the court allowed for “scientific and technological progress.”90  The court 
stated the issue was one of first impression in the state and cited opinions from 
 
 81. See id. at 646.  Simply put, eminent domain refers to the power of government 
to take private land for public use following reasonable compensation.  Eminent Do-
main, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Certain private entities, including 
RECs, may also be granted the power of eminent domain by statute.  MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 523.262.1–2 (2016). 
 82. Carroll Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Lambert, 403 S.W.3d 637, 645 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2012). 
 83. Id. at 646. 
 84. Id. at 644. 
 85. 692 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). 
 86. Id. at 827. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 828. 
 89. See id. at 829. 
 90. Id. 
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other jurisdictions; those other jurisdictions reasoned that adding a coaxial ca-
ble, as opposed to a telephone wire, imposed no greater burden.91  The court 
referenced “the general rule that easements in gross for commercial purposes 
are particularly alienable and transferable.”92  The court also found that “it is 
in the public interest to use the facilities already installed for the purpose of 
carrying out this [broadly defined original] intention to provide the most eco-
nomically feasible and least environmentally damaging vehicle for installing 
cable systems.”93 
In determining the rights of the easement holder, the characteristics of the 
easement play a pivotal role.  For example, courts are less likely to find that an 
expanded use of a prescriptive easement is reasonable and valid.  In Ogg v. 
Mediacom,94 a REC held a prescriptive easement95 across the landowner’s 
property and authorized – without the landowner’s consent – a license to utilize 
the REC’s existing poles to hang a fiber-optic cable six feet lower than the 
electric cables, which were installed eighteen-to-twenty feet high.96  In an ac-
tion for trespass by landowners against the cable company, the trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the cable company after focusing on the 
issue of whether the additional fiber-optic cable “would create an unreasonable 
additional burden or servitude” on the landowner.97  The Missouri Court of 
Appeals for the Western District determined that this was not the proper anal-
ysis because the prescriptive easement held by the REC effectively limited the 
rights of any license that it may grant.98 
The court reasoned that “the rights of the holder of an easement acquired 
by prescription are defined solely by the character and extent of the use made 
thereof during the prescriptive period.”99  The court specified that “no different 
or greater use could lawfully be made of that portion of the [landowner’s] prop-
erty by [the REC] or [the cable television company], neither of whom had the 
legal right to unilaterally expand, in character or extent, the prior prescriptive 
use.”100  This definitive statement does not delve into the difference in charac-
ter between the use of cables by the REC and the use of cables by the cable 
television company, but rather it seems to rely more on the proposition that 
“prescriptive easements ‘are no favorites of the law’” and are thus strictly con-
fined.101 
 
 91. Id. at 828–29. 
 92. Id. at 829. 
 93. Id. 
 94. 142 S.W.3d 801 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). 
 95. See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 96. Ogg, 142 S.W.3d at 804–05. 
 97. Id. at 808. 
 98. Id. at 810. 
 99. Id. at 809 (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. at 810. 
 101. See id. at 809 (quoting Cook v. Bolin, 296 S.W.2d 181, 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1956)).  In holding that the REC could not license the cable company rights that it did 
not have, a footnote also acknowledges that “to the extent the purported license . . . 
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D. Trespass and Remedies 
The tort of trespass is commonly recognized as every unauthorized, and 
therefore unlawful, entry on to the property of another.102  In the context of 
easements, a trespass occurs when the user “exceeds his rights, either in manner 
or extent of use.”103  A change in the degree of use is allowed, but a change in 
the quality of an easement – “a substantial new burden on the servient estate” 
– will be a trespass.104  The issue boils down to whether or not there is a change 
in the character of the easement.  The landowner has the right to control 
changes in the character of any easement.105 
A trespasser is liable for all damages resulting from the trespass.106  The 
distinction between permanent and temporary injury is essential to determining 
damages.  Traditionally, these measures were based on actual physical dam-
ages; an early case sets out the Missouri rule, stating, “Where the destruction 
of the thing includes but a temporary injury to the land, . . . the true measure of 
damages is the cost of replacing it and the rental value of the land until it is 
replaced.”107  However, “where the destruction of the thing inflicts more than 
a temporary injury to the land, or the replacement would be impossible or te-
dious and uncertain both in cost and result, the criterion is the damage inflicted 
 
plac[ed] an unreasonable additional burden or servitude upon the . . . fee simple title, it 
was also unlawful under . . . Eureka.”  Id. at 810 n.13. 
 102. See Crook v. Sheehan Enters., 740 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (“[A 
t]respass is the unauthorized entry by a person upon the land of another, regardless of 
the degree of force used, even if no damage is done, or the injury is slight.”). 
 103. Macios v. Hensley, 886 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Kavanaugh v. St. Louis Traction Co., 105 S.W. 278, 282 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1907) (“The owner of a dominant estate can neither increase the servitude imposed on 
the servient tenement or change its character.  This rule is a recognition of the right of 
the owner of property to control its use, and is pushed to the extent of holding that, 
although the proposed change in the character of the servitude would prove beneficial, 
rather than injurious, to the servient estate, it is for the owner of the latter to say whether 
or not he will tolerate the change.”).  Kavanaugh approved of the outcome of a case 
where a pipe and subsequent fill was not allowed in an easement granted to carry water 
through an open ditch.  See id.; cf. Maasen v. Shaw, 133 S.W.3d 514, 520 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2004) (parking vehicles is a change in the quality of use in an easement for ingress 
and egress); Macios, 886 S.W.2d at 752 (docking boats is a change in the quality of use 
in an easement for ingress and egress).  The landowner’s control is restricted to con-
trolling how the servient owner may change the easement; the landowner may not uni-
laterally change the character of the easement outside what was granted.  See Gerber v. 
Appel, 173 S.W.2d 90, 93–94 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943) (“There is certainly nothing in [the 
easement] that allows the owner of a fee to change a walkway into a vehicular road-
way.”). 
 106. See Smith v. Woodard, 15 S.W.3d 768, 773 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (“[W]ith 
trespass no actual damages must be proven; the claimant is entitled to at least nominal 
damages.”). 
 107. Adam v. Chi., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 122 S.W. 1136, 1136–37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1909). 
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on the market value of the land.”108  If a landowner has been deprived of the 
land in the absence of other damage, fair rental value is an appropriate rem-
edy.109  If no actual damage results from a trespass, a court may still award 
nominal damages.110  Punitive damages are available “where the use is in reck-
less disregard of or indifference to the rights of a property owner.”111  Any 
intentional trespass satisfies submission of punitive damages to a jury.112  A 
good-faith belief that one’s actions are legal removes punitive damages from 
consideration.113 
In Sterbenz v. Kansas City Power and Light Company,114 the Missouri 
Court of Appeals for the Western District analyzed the consequences of tres-
pass by an entity endowed with eminent domain.115  Of the available remedies, 
the court explained that a “landowner ‘may proceed by way of injunction to 
restrain the installation; or he may sue in ejectment; or he may avail himself of 
[section 523.090]; or he may maintain a common law action for damages.’”116  
If a suit for damages is chosen, the method for determining damages varies 
based on whether the trespass injury is temporary or permanent, as previously 
discussed.117  With a new permanent utility across a property, actual damages 
would be the same as condemnation.118  This would be calculated as the loss 
in the fair market value of the entire piece of property before and after the tak-
ing.119  The court posited that a “‘trespassing’ condemning authority would be 
required to bring a separate eminent domain action . . . to secure ‘title’ to the 
 
 108. Id. at 1137. 
 109. Kitterman v. Simrall, 924 S.W.2d 872, 879 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); see also S. 
Mo. Dist. Council of Assemblies of God v. Hendricks, 807 S.W.2d 141, 147 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1991). 
 110. Woodard, 15 S.W.3d at 773 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); see also Crooks v. Sheehan 
Enters., 740 S.W.2d 333, 336 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). 
 111. Ogg v. Mediacom, L.L.C., 142 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). 
 112. Wright v. Edison, 619 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 
 113. Tamko Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Arch Assocs., 830 S.W.2d 434, 441 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1992). 
 114. 333 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 115. Id. at 7–10.   
 116. Id. at 7–8 (alteration in original) (quoting Beetschen v. Shell Pipe Line Corp, 
248 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952)); see discussion supra Section III.D.  An in-
junction would halt the installation.  An action in ejectment would be for the recovery 
of possession for the land in question.  See MO. REV. STAT. § 524.010 (2016).  Section 
523.090 provides that any person may have damages ascertained in condemnation pro-
ceedings when their property has been damaged for public use.  MO. REV. STAT. § 
523.090 (2016). 
 117. Sterbenz, 333 S.W.3d at 8.  See supra notes 106–13 and accompanying text.  
 118. Sterbenz, 333 S.W.3d at 9. 
 119. Id.  Condemnation proceedings are set out in chapter 523.  MO. REV. STAT. § 
523 (2016). 
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appropriated tract, though presumably, no further compensation for the ‘tak-
ing’ would be awarded given the equivalently measured permanent trespass 
damages.”120 
Unjust enrichment, an alternate theory of recovery, refers to “the effect of 
the failure of a party to make restitution where it ought to be made.”121  Recov-
ery under the theory of unjust enrichment requires a benefit to the defendant 
from the plaintiff and retention of that benefit by the defendant; above all else, 
the defendant’s retention of the benefit must be inequitable.122  The Restate-
ment (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment allows restitution for the 
conferment of a benefit stemming from a trespass and provides that damages 
in the form of rental value may be appropriate under certain circumstances 
when the defendant uses the property without authorization and receives 
“saved expenditure.”123 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
The Eighth Circuit held that Sho-Me’s use of the easements for public-
serving telecommunication purposes exceeded the scope of its easements and 
constituted a trespass; however, the court found that unjust enrichment was not 
an available remedy.124  The court reached its conclusion by first analyzing 
whether the easements authorized Sho-Me to utilize the fiber-optic cables for 
commercial telecommunications.125  Finding that the easements did not allow 
this use, the court next analyzed whether exceeding the rights of those ease-
ments constituted a trespass.126  Confirming the trespass liability, the court then 
looked to whether unjust-enrichment liability was a proper remedy against an 
entity capable of exercising eminent domain and held that it was not.127 
Because the parties agreed on Sho-Me’s authorization to install and use 
the fiber-optic cables for internal communication associated with supplying 
electricity, the court began with an analysis of whether the easements gave Sho-
 
 120. Sterbenz, 333 S.W.3d at 9. 
 121. Graves v. Berkowitz, 15 S.W.3d 59, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). 
 122. Green Quarries, Inc. v. Raasch, 676 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). 
 123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011) (finding saved expenditure often comes about because “the defendant 
has made a valuable use of the defendant’s property without paying for it.”).  The Re-
statement’s illustration on this point involves a developer selling a piece of land and 
then, while the purchaser owns the land but delays building on it, using the land to store 
and subsequently dispose of dirt from grading projects elsewhere in the development.  
Id.  There is no injury or interference with the landowner, but rental value of the land 
during the time the dirt was present is the proper measure of restitution.  Id. 
 124. Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., 852 F.3d 795, 804–05 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 125. Id. at 799–802. 
 126. Id. at 802–04. 
 127. Id. at 804–05. 
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Me the right to utilize the fiber-optic cables for commercial telecommunica-
tions.128  After looking to section 523.283 and prior Missouri case law as a 
basis for interpreting “expanded use,” the Eighth Circuit concluded that the 
easement did not allow use of the cable for commercial telecommunications.129  
The court reached this position after analyzing Carroll Electric to extract the 
meaning of expanded use in Missouri in similar circumstances of a REC at-
tempting to place fiber-optic cables for commercial telecommunication in an 
easement for an electric line.130  Carroll Electric, relying on the statutory def-
inition of “expanded use” in section 523.283, held that communication lines 
within an easement authorizing electric power transmission lines do not allow 
for any non-electric uses.131 
In the instant decision, the court concluded that section 523.283 made no 
change to existing law for understanding expanded use – a crucial fact because 
the statute applies only to post-2006 easements.132  The court then relied on 
Eureka, Ogg, and Cape Girardeau for the proposition that the easement would 
not authorize commercial telecommunication use.133  Dicta from Cape 
Girardeau – that a use “distinct from the avocation of” or “entirely disassoci-
ated” with the original grant of the easement is not permitted – served as the 
determinative rationale of the court.134 
The court summarily rejected Sho-Me’s remaining arguments of “same 
general character” and “unlimited reasonable use” to justify the use beyond 
what is specifically granted in the easement.135  Sho-Me argued that the use of 
the easement could change to a use of a similar character, but the court held 
that only an increased degree of use of the easement was authorized and not a 
new, unauthorized use – even one that was physically similar.136  Sho-Me also 
argued that the original terms of the easements were general enough that Sho-
Me could make unlimited reasonable use of the easements.137  However, the 
court held that the use of the easements must still be limited to the original 
purpose of their creation.138 
In concluding its discussion on expanded use, the court addressed Henley 
in response to Sho-Me’s argument that the easement should not be restricted to 
 
 128. Id. at 799–800. 
 129. Id. at 800–03. 
 130. Id. at 800. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 800–01. 
 133. Id. at 801–02 (citing Eureka Real Estate & Inv. Co. v. S. Real Estate & Fin. 
Co, 200 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. 1947); Ogg v. Mediacom, 142 S.3d 801 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); 
St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Cape Girardeau Bell Tel. Co., 114 S.W. 586 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1908)). 
 134. Id. at 801. 
 135. Id. at 802. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. at 802–03. 
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its “original purpose.”139  The court explained that Henley, which held that a 
coaxial cable for television purposes was within the scope of an easement 
granted for telephone and electricity, was inapposite to the easements at issue 
in Sho-Me’s case.140  The court looked at the assumed intention of the grantors 
of the easement in Henley and the framing of the old easement as broadly cov-
ering communications to note that the new coaxial cable was still within the 
original grant.141  Finding no intention of Sho-Me’s easement to authorize com-
mercial telecommunication use, the court ultimately concluded that the ease-
ments in Carroll Electric, rather than Henley, were more analogous to Sho-
Me’s easements.142 
The court next affirmed Sho-Me’s trespass liability.143  Although Sho-Me 
maintained a position that “invisible light pulses” could not constitute a tres-
pass, the court held that Sho-Me’s unauthorized use itself constituted tres-
pass.144  Sho-Me referenced, to no avail, an Arkansas case with nearly identical 
circumstances where the Eighth Circuit found that Arkansas law did not rec-
ognize a trespass claim for mere light signals, but the court found that decision 
inapplicable to Missouri law.145  The court held that the unauthorized use was 
enough to hold Sho-Me subject to trespass liability, regardless of whether there 
was a further physical invasion of land.146 
After affirming Sho-Me’s liability for trespass, the court next discussed 
the trial court’s damages award, which was granted on a theory of unjust en-
richment.147  Using the Sterbenz case as a model for remedies available in a 
case where an entity with eminent domain power ignores that power and tres-
passes, the Eighth Circuit found a plaintiff limited to only four remedies.148  
Sterbenz provided for “an election of remedies”: (1) an injunction to stop in-
stallation, (2) an ejectment, (3) a proceeding for condemnation, or (4) “a com-
mon law action for damages.”149  Finding no possibility for an alternative rem-
edy to a list specifying an election of remedies and recognizing that the land-
owners could point to no Missouri cases allowing unjust enrichment under sim-
ilar circumstances, the court held that unjust enrichment was not a proper rem-
edy for an unauthorized use of land.150  This proposition was supported by an 
early Missouri case that held a suit for use and occupation without a landlord-
 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 803. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 804. 
 144. Id. at 803. 
 145. Id. at 803–04. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 804. 
 148. Id. (citing Sterbenz v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 333 S.W.3d 1, 7–8 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2010)). 
 149. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Sterbenz, 33 S.W.3d at 7–8). 
 150. Id. 
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tenant relationship was not proper.151  The existence of section 523.283, with 
references only to an action for trespass or expanded use, further bolstered the 
court’s holding that unjust enrichment was not a proper remedy in this case.152 
V. COMMENT 
The court held that Sho-Me’s use of the fiber-optic cable for commercial 
telecommunications made it liable under Missouri law for trespass based on 
the theory of “expanded use” presented in section 523.283, which the court 
determined was identical to earlier law.153  The statute’s definition of “in-
creased footprint or burden” to “mean a different type of use or a use presenting 
an unreasonably burdensome impact of the property” is instructive, although 
the meaning of “a different type of use” is not explicit.154  This Part first argues 
that, based on Missouri cases, a proper understanding of a different type of use 
should be construed as requiring an actual additional physical imposition.  
Next, this Part claims that the Sho-Me court should have placed greater em-
phasis on Henley and then contrasts Sho-Me’s easements with those in Ogg.  A 
policy argument against the Sho-Me court’s holding is then advanced, along 
with a discussion of the implications of that holding.  Finally, a proper trespass 
remedy is considered, assuming a court finds trespass liability in contradiction 
of the other arguments presented here. 
A. A “Different Type of Use” Should Entail a Different Type of Use 
with an Additional Physical Imposition 
In this case, the argument that the coextensive transmission of infor-
mation for commercial use, along with the admittedly allowable use for internal 
communications, could possibly present an increased footprint or an unreason-
ably burdensome impact on the property would be baseless.  The nature of light 
signals carrying information within the glass strands of a fiber-optic cable for 
commercial use, as opposed to internal use, clearly does not impact the under-
lying property in a burdensome manner.  Both parties acknowledged the right-
 
 151. See id. at 804–05 (citing Young v. Home Tel. Co., 201 S.W. 635, 636 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1918)). 
 152. Id. at 805.  On remand for trespass damages, the jury was instructed to “award 
Plaintiffs such sum as you may find from the evidence to be the fair market rental value 
of Defendants’ use of the fiber optic cable on Plaintiffs’ land for commercial-telecom-
munications purpose from January 21, 2005[,] until February 2, 2015.”  Jury Instruc-
tions at 20, Barfield, 852 F.3d 795 (No. 11CV04321), 2015 WL 1305552.  The jury 
awarded $129,211,337 pursuant to that instruction and an additional $1,300,000 in pu-
nitive damages.  Judgment in a Civil Case, Barfield, 852 F.3d 795 (No. 11-04321-CV-
C-NKL), 2017 WL 3972429.  However, the judgment was vacated as being against the 
weight of the evidence.  Order at 3, Barfield, 852 F.3d 795 (No. 888). 
 153. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 800–05. 
 154. MO. REV. STAT. § 523.283.2(2) (2016) (emphasis added). 
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ful placement of the cable within the easement for internal communication pur-
poses;155 thus, the installation of the cable cannot be a source of complaint.  
Therefore, the keystone of the dispute is whether use of the fiber-optic cable 
for commercial telecommunications constitutes a different type of use. 
Cape Girardeau is the sensible starting point of discussion for discerning 
the critical question of what exactly constitutes a different type of use.  Cape 
Girardeau frames the point of diversion as “a commercial enterprise, distinct 
from the avocation of” and “entirely dissociated” from the original grant.156  
Eureka echoes this sentiment in that construction of a new line with “no con-
nection whatever” with the original grant equated to a new burden.157  Sho-
Me’s commercial telecommunication use of the fiber-optic cable is not an en-
tirely separate undertaking. 
The reasoning in Cape Girardeau appears to be directly applicable in 
Sho-Me’s case.  The cable is “a legitimate development” when used for Sho-
Me’s electrical transmission purposes, but, in the language of Cape Girardeau, 
“[when] serv[ing] the general public as a commercial enterprise, distinct from 
the avocation of [Sho-Me’s electrical transmission], it constitutes . . . a servi-
tude not contemplated in the original grant.”158  This conclusion necessarily 
presupposes that use for commercial telecommunications cannot be “a legiti-
mate development” for Sho-Me.159 
It is imperative to note that the line of cases used as support in Cape 
Girardeau involved a new physical imposition on the servient estate.160  Rich 
involved a physical impact that was nevertheless approved by the court because 
of its relevance to the purpose of the easement.161  Pearce involved the finding 
of an additional servitude due to a dramatic expansion of telegraph/telephone 
infrastructure within a railroad easement that would have affected the land in a 
manner unanticipated within the grant for railroad purposes.162  The treatise 
referenced in Cape Girardeau also referred to another case involving the con-
struction of larger infrastructure than would have been needed for the original 
railroad use.163  Whether an additional use is a “legitimate development” de-
pends on whether such use was contemplated within the grant, which, in turn, 
seems to depend on the impact the use imposes. 
 
 155. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 799. 
 156. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Cape Girardeau Bell Tel. Co., 114 S.W. 586, 588 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1908) (emphasis added). 
 157. Eureka Real Estate & Inv. Co. v. S. Real Estate & Fin. Co., 200 S.W.2d 328, 
332 (Mo. 1947) (emphasis added). 
 158. Cape Girardeau Bell, 114 S.W. at 587–88 (original language from Cape 
Girardeau Bell with insertions for Sho-Me). 
 159. Id. at 587. 
 160. See supra text accompanying notes 45–63. 
 161. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Rich, 19 Kan. 517, 520 (1878). 
 162. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Smith, 18 A. 910, 916 (Md. 1889) (consolidating ten 
cases, including Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pearce). 
 163. JONES, supra note 48. 
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In the context of a railroad, the grantor would anticipate the infrastructure 
necessary for the operation of a railroad, such as tracks and telegraph lines re-
quired for support of the railroad.  The infrastructure necessary for a different 
use – infrastructure geared specifically to support telecommunications at a 
commercial level – would require a level of infrastructure not anticipated in the 
original railroad grant.  For Sho-Me, no additional infrastructure was required 
to support the commercial telecommunication use.  The transmission occurred 
within the admittedly authorized single cable.  Because the underlying estate 
was not burdened in any additional manner, unlike the expansion of telephone 
and telegraph lines and poles in the early railroad cases, the different type of 
use here should not rise to the level of being considered an expanded use.164 
B. The Sho-Me Court Downplayed the Direct Relevance of Henley and 
Ogg is Not Instructive 
Although the court analogized Sho-Me’s situation to Carrol Electric and 
dismissed its similarity to Henley,165 the context of Henley is immensely rele-
vant.  The court reasoned that Henley was not on point because Sho-Me’s ease-
ments “d[id] not indicate any intention to allow use for public-serving telecom-
munication purposes.”166  However, Henley more broadly requires consistency 
with the principal use; the court allows “purposes not inconsistent with the 
principal use granted.”167  In Henley, easements from 1922 permitting electric, 
telephone, and telegraphic service, were construed to cover additional new ca-
bles and wiring for transmitting television programming.168  This broad reading 
of an easement, one that takes the approach of allowing a reasonable evolution 
of the use of an easement where no additional actual burden is created, is di-
rectly applicable to Sho-Me’s use of sending additional information through 
the fiber-optic cable that is otherwise rightfully within the scope of the ease-
ment. 
Moreover, the “dispositive issue” in Henley turned on the exclusivity of 
the easements – “the exclusion of the owner and possessor of the servient ten-
ement from participation in the rights granted.”169  The court in Henley looked 
to other jurisdictions to reach the conclusion that the addition of a coaxial cable 
for television added to existing electric and telephone poles without the 
 
 164. In June 2018, an addition to section 394.080.1(7) expanded the definition of 
“electric transmission and distribution lines or systems” to include “cooperative-owned 
or cooperative subsidiary-owned copper and fiber optic cable, facilities and technology, 
or any combination thereof, that carries, or has the capacity to carry, light signals and 
data beyond or in addition to the light signals and data necessary for the transmission 
and distribution of electricity.”  H.B. 1880, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2018). 
 165. Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., 852 F.3d 795, 802–03 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 166. Id. at 803. 
 167. Henley v. Cont’l Cablevision of St. Louis Cty., Inc., 692 S.W.2d 825, 828 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis added). 
 168. Id. at 827. 
 169. Id. at 828. 
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owner’s consent created no additional burden where the easements were exclu-
sive and thus apportionable.170  The landowners subject to Sho-Me’s easements 
cannot anticipate to use the structures installed by the REC.  The landowners 
cannot expect to use that portion of Sho-Me’s easement wherein the existing 
electrical cables and the fiber-optic cable reside. 
Although Ogg is similar to the current case in that it involves a REC and 
fiber-optic cables, it is notably different because the easements acquired by the 
REC in Ogg were prescriptive.171  In considering the holdings of other cases 
involving easements, the characteristics of those easements and their similari-
ties to the case at hand is of the utmost importance.  Sho-Me’s electrical ease-
ments in dispute were express easements created through grants.172  Ogg’s out-
come relies on the rationale that prescriptive easements should be strictly con-
fined to their nature as developed during the prescriptive period.173  The deci-
sion in Ogg detailed the specifications of the REC’s prescriptive easement and 
held that without the running of another ten-year prescriptive period, “no dif-
ferent or greater use could lawfully be made of that portion of the [landowner’s] 
property.”174  Sho-Me’s easements should be analyzed not under the narrow 
constraints of expanded use in a prescriptive easement, but rather as an express, 
exclusive easement more similar to Henley. 
C. Policy Implications of the Sho-Me Court’s Holding 
The “expanded use” threshold for easements advanced in Missouri cases 
demonstrates that developments necessary to the purpose of the easement 
within the physical confines of the easement are acceptable.  Thus, as in the 
line of cases relying on Cape Girardeau, as in Carroll Electric, and as agreed 
upon by the parties in the instant decision, it is clear that the fiber-optic cable 
for internal communication purposes is rightfully within the scope of the ease-
ment.175  From a policy standpoint, requiring the REC to either renegotiate 
easements or condemn the entire network of infrastructure for what amounts to 
a change in capacity on a fiber-optic cable to add the external commercial tel-
ecommunication use seems an absurd result.  The cost will be passed on to 
users of the electricity and commercial telecommunications while the landown-
ers, who have already been compensated for the physical space of the ease-
ment, will be compensated again. 
As in Henley, where the court broadly construed the language of the ease-
ment to achieve a result in line with the original intention that would also allow 
 
 170. Id. at 828–29. 
 171. Ogg v. Mediacom, L.L.C., 142 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).  See 
discussion supra Section III.A for a comparison of the types of easements. 
 172. Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., 852 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 173. Ogg, 142 S.W.3d at 809–10. 
 174. Id. at 810.  That use was specifically recognized by the court in Ogg to be of 
one “to operate and maintain electrical power cables on poles at a height of approxi-
mately eighteen to twenty feet.”  Id. 
 175. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 799; see discussion supra Section III.B. 
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss3/9
2018] EXCEEDING THE SCOPE OF AN EASEMENT 795 
“the most economically feasible and least environmentally damaging vehicle 
for installing cable systems,”176 the outcome of the present case should be ad-
dressed in an equally utilitarian manner.  The disallowed “different type of use” 
in section 523.283 and prior case law should be interpreted as requiring a dif-
ferent type of physical use of the easement.  If the court in Sho-Me had inter-
preted the phrase “different type of use” in this manner, the case’s outcome 
would have resembled the practical and non-wasteful outcome reached in Hen-
ley.177  There would be no “expanded use” and thus no trespass. 
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Electric Co-
operative178 is illustrative on two major points.  First, the granting language of 
the easement is of paramount importance.  This is true from the perspective of 
the landowner wanting to limit any potential undesired outcomes for a piece of 
property and from the perspective of a utility contemplating the nature of po-
tential uses for the easement.  It would be revealing to know the acquisition 
price that Sho-Me negotiated for those easements that fortuitously included 
some reference to communications compared to those that created the dispute 
in this case.  In terms of considering compensation for what would be consid-
ered a perpetual easement in either case, it would be reasonable to conclude the 
value demanded by the holder of the servient estate may be similar.  After all, 
there is no impact to the underlying property based on a change in degree alone.  
Regardless, the drafter of the easement has an incentive to add inclusive lan-
guage; the potential servient estate has an incentive to diligently review and 
negotiate, if possible. 
 
 176. Henley v. Cont’l Cablevision of St. Louis Cty., Inc., 692 S.W.2d 825, 829 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985). 
 177. In June 2018, the Missouri legislature added section 394.085 to the chapter 
concerning RECs and made the policy statement that “expanding and accelerating ac-
cess to high speed broadband communications services throughout the entire state of 
Missouri is necessary, desirable, [and] in the best interests of the citizens of this state . 
. . .”  H.B. 1880, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2018).  While not “diminishing the 
rights of property owners under the laws of this state,” the general assembly set forth 
the following intent: 
 
In recognition that the high capital cost of deploying fiber optics technologies 
to provide broadband communications services impedes access to such ser-
vices, and the rural electric cooperatives deploy fiber optics technologies for 
use in the operation of their electric system infrastructure, it is the intent of the 
general assembly to facilitate and to encourage rural electric cooperatives and 
their affiliates, either collectively, or individually, to continue to enter into and 
establish voluntary contracts or other forms of joint or cooperative agreements 




 178. 852 F.3d 795. 
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Second, although railroad and telegraph easement cases of a century ago 
are certainly analogous to the case at hand, the disconnect between transporta-
tion of people and freight on railroad tracks and transmission of information in 
telegraph and telephone lines in those cases is substantially more attenuated 
than the transmission of electricity and information across outwardly similar 
wires that can be situated on the same poles.  The former seems to truly be a 
different type of use, where the commercial communication aspect eclipses the 
railroad usage by demanding greatly expanded infrastructure of a separate na-
ture, but the latter is a much more subtle distinction.  Section 523.283’s “dif-
ferent type of use” is a nebulous concept intended to protect landowners, but, 
as discussed above, a different type of use that actually has some sort of phys-
ical impact is a justified interpretation of the concept.179 
D. Measuring a Trespass Remedy Under These Circumstances 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that trespass liability is proper 
through the “expanded use” analysis, the determination of whether Sho-Me’s 
unauthorized use of the fiber-optic cable is a temporary or permanent trespass 
will have significant consequences on the resulting damages.  The trespass 
should be categorized as permanent.  A trespass of a permanent nature will 
result in the award of a difference in the market value of the land.180  Applied 
to Sho-Me’s use of the fiber-optic cable for commercial telecommunications, 
the resulting change in market value would be negligible, although nominal 
damages would still be applicable.  The alternative – a temporary trespass –  
would result in the cost of replacement and rental value until replaced.181  Ap-
plying this measure of damages to an “expanded use” trespass presents the 
query of what damages exist in terms of justifying rental value in the absence 
of any physical imposition. 
In a case involving a trespass based on an addition of a fiber-optic cable 
to a REC’s poles, in the context of cable company installing the wire on a 
REC’s prescriptive easement, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western 
District approved the difference between fair market value of the property be-
fore and after the trespass as “the proper measure of damages.”182  This out-
come seems more in line with a traditional trespass remedy than allowing fair 
market rental value of the use of the fiber-optic cable.  The alternative would 
be equivalent to an unjust enrichment claim – an outcome that, although pos-
sibly consistent with the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrich-
ment, seems to be at odds with the specified remedies mentioned in Sterbenz.183  
 
 179. MO. REV. STAT. § 523.283.2(2) (2016); see discussion supra Part IV. 
 180. Sterbenz v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 333 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2010). 
 181. Id. at 8. 
 182. Ogg v. Mediacom, L.L.C., 382 S.W.3d 108, 118 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 
 183. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 40 (AM. LAW INST. 2011), with Sterbenz, 333 S.W.3d at 7–8. 
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Allowing for rental value – a value equivalent to loss of use of the cable 
– seems to invite an erroneous result.184  If Sho-Me had licensed a company 
vested with the power of eminent domain to add a new cable for telecommuni-
cation purposes, the result, absent landowner permission, would be a trespass 
of a permanent nature and condemnation value would be appropriate. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Development by utilities as a reaction to improvements in technology is 
inevitable, but there must be a balance between that development and the rights 
of landowners.  Where an easement transects a landowner’s property, the ease-
ment holder should carefully implement changes in accordance with the grant 
of the original easement.  Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative 
demonstrated how the Eighth Circuit interpreted and provided a remedy for a 
nonphysical “expanded use” of an easement in Missouri.185 
As developed in this case, the “different type of use” branch of the defi-
nition of “expanded use”186 encompassed a nonphysical expansion of a use that 
was related to the purpose granted in the original easement language – the use 
of the fiber-optic cable for internal communications was critical to the purpose 
of the easement.  The result is that trespass liability will apply in excessive use 
cases of easements where there is no physical difference to the servient estate; 
this is an outcome perhaps expanding traditional Missouri easement trespass 
doctrine. 
The practical result of this will currently affect few categories of ease-
ments because the class of easements where an expanded use is feasible with 
no physical difference is limited.  Those holding the easements impacted by 
the result will face the cost of bringing the easements into compliance through 
negotiations or condemnation, and the expense will likely pass to the consumer 
and delay further expansion of the infrastructure.  The outcome may also be 
influential with the emergence of new technologies and where there is a desire 
 
 184. In June 2018, the Missouri legislature fixed this problem with an addition to 
section 394.080.1(11) that states, in part: 
 
If a property owner prevails against a rural electric cooperative or a cooperative 
subsidiary in a suit in trespass or in inverse condemnation filed after August 28, 
2018, the trespass shall be deemed permanent and the actual damages awarded 
shall be the “fair market value” . . . .  In no case filed after August 28, 2018, 
may evidence of revenues or profits derived, nor the rental value of an assem-
bled communications corridor, be admissible in determining “fair market 
value.”  Such actual damages shall be fixed at the time of the initial trespass, 
shall not be deemed to continue, accumulate, or accrue, and upon payment of 
damages the defendant shall be granted a permanent easement for the trespass 
litigated. 
 
H.B. 1880, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2018). 
 185. 852 F.3d 795, 802–03 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 186. MO. REV. STAT. § 523.283.2(2) (2016). 
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to use existing easements in an efficient manner because of the practical diffi-
culties and negative impacts of developing new corridors for similar ease-
ments. 
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